This article investigates the importance of the evolution of Adorno's interpretation of Husserl for the formation of his own philosophy. The weakness of Husserl' notion of immediate data is revealed within the light of Hans Cornelius's Transcendentale Systematik. When Adorno discovers in his Habilitationsschrift the importance of the social setting and ideological function of theory, he departs from Cornelius' transcendentalism as norm for his reflection -and this insight is deployed against Husserl. Henceforth, Husserl's philosophy is interpreted as idealist, as a prima philosophia, as a philosophy of identity and totality and ultimately in service of the totalitarian political tendencies.
philosophia, as a philosophy of identity and totality and ultimately in service of the totalitarian political tendencies.
In this article I would like to investigate an aspect of Adorno's work that has attracted relatively little attention, namely his earliest development and in particular his relation to Husserl's phenomenology. My aim is not to provide an exhaustive presentation of the early Adorno but to trace the genesis of his thought, right from the beginning, insofar as it depended on a criticism of Husserlian phenomenology. In doing so, I
shall situate the development of Adorno's reading of Husserl within the framework of his early fidelity to Cornelius' work and then of the birth of his own philosophy in the 1930s. In conclusion, it will be indicated how the mature Adorno finally submitted phenomenology to his meta-criticism. 
Similarly, in the introduction to Der Begriff des Unbewuflten in der transzendentalen
Seelenlehre, Adorno says:
The basic determinations of the transcendental philosophy exposed here link up closely with the epistemological researches of Hans Cornelius whose founding of the 'Transcendentalen Systematik' is presupposed for all that follows and with whose researches our observations would correspond also there where it does not make an explicit appeal to it. 4 In other words, it is not a question of an occasional inclination to the thought of his mentor, but rather a standing adherence to it. 5 Thus, the appropriate place to start to But instead of converting himself to the capacities of the intentional consciousness, he tried to refute the theory of eidetic intuition and moved closer to Kantianism -he started searching for the foundation of universally valid judgements in the unity of
consciousness. An influence from Gestaltism is perceptible in the fact he now underscores the interconnection {Zusammenhang) in which all experiences were embedded. Thus, turning against all atomistic psychologisms whatever they were, he laid stress on the interconnections between different lived or subjective experiences.
The terminology of 'Erlebnisse' (experiences) and 'psychische Tatsachen'
(psychological facts) consequently makes room for the so-called 'unmittelbar gegebene Gegen-stande' (immediately given objects). This notion refers to 'the only objects given without any mediation of concepts and thus, the only ones capable of providing a reliable basis of the consciousness'. 6 The immediately given objects are linked through a set of relations that act as condition for the emergence of givens. The conditions for immediate givens are at the same time the conditions for the possibility of experience in general and these conditions correspond more or less with the Kantian categories. By this development Cornelius wanted to make the transition from idealism to empirism. of the unconscious to be identified?
Contradiction in the conception of immediate data
We now generally call philosophies of the unconscious in the first instance all doctrines that affirm the independence of the validity of its statements from the consciousness, and which asserts that there is for them some or other mode of cognition (mostly such that is based on a transcendent foundation of the 'thing as such') independent from the consciousness, that enables them to make statements that are absolute and surpassing in principle the statements that are founded in the consciousness.
24
Such a philosophy is clearly contradicted by a transcendental philosophy that deals precisely with the transcendental or fundamental conditions of all possible knowledge, conditions that would be situated nowhere else than immanent to the consciousness. On the other hand, to recognize the consciousness as the stable foundation of all existence is not possible for a philosophy that contests the dignity or the integrity of the consciousness -in other words, for a philosophy of the unconscious.
By the idea of the unconscious that Adorno puts forward, he attempts to show that the whole of the 'unconscious' could be exhaustively interpreted as structures belonging to the consciousness itself. Thus, the unconscious embraces on the one hand a layer of forgotten experiences, of experiences blotted out of the memory and on the other hand a layer of ordered relations, which are the rules of categories, non-accessible to direct experience because they are the condition of the possibility of the consciousness. 25 It is within this framework that Adorno proposes suggestions for the correction of Kant's philosophy of the categories, and searches for a connection with
Freudian psychoanalysis -a long-standing fascination of Adorno's. Why the Freudian theory? Because, according to Adorno, it is there that one could find a way of reflection on conscious meanings and on the mental laws discoverable by the reason.
We consider psychoanalysis as the appropriate epistemological method for knowing the unconscious state of affairs. We choose it especially because it corresponds to a particular extent to the demands of the transcendental method, but then also because of all the psychological disciplines it alone is directed at the analysis of the intra- still stayed loyal to the transcendental philosophy. But this loyalty opens up to declarations about the aim of his work that put him in a frame that has little in common with the epistemology of Cornelius, 27 and which was still entirely absent from the first work on Husserl. That Adorno keeps himself busy with the problem of the unconscious is not to be explained merely by epistemological motivations, but rather by the fact that the popularity and confusion in the notion of the unconscious arose from a 'deep time-historical necessity'. 28 What is it all about?
The aim of his research is to put a theory of the unconscious in place against the use of this notion in vitalistic or organic theories, where it serves to oppose 'rationalism' by contesting the dignity or integrity of the consciousness (as I have already indicated).
The debate against such theories is justified by the conviction that every theory exercises a function that is determined by its surrounding social reality. What, then, is this dangerous function that lies at the origin of the popularity of the notion of the unconscious and that would at the same time be the justification for Adorno's criticism?
The theory of the unconscious contradicts the social order in force as an economicrational order. This fact invites the suspicion that the theory supplements that which lacks in reality, and that which lacks in reality is sublimated {verkldrt) by theory -in other words, the theory functions as an ideology. 29 The ideology of the unconscious tends to justify a reality (independently of the processes of economic production) into The ideological function of the doctrine of the unconscious continues itself by the positive estimation of those unconscious forces that throw the individual back on him/herself and turn him/her away from social relations, from which he/she believes him/herself to be independent and from which the individual draws him/herself into a private existence, instead of letting him/herself too far in with the possibility of its change. 30 Undermining the 'dignity of reason' is then not only aimed at turning away from the social reality, but also at defending a social order that is established when business organizes itself illegitimately and blindly according to its power and its urges. In this way, the ideology of the unconscious shelters exploitation, imperialism and fascism, which are supposedly the consequences of unconscious and fateful necessities, given the fact that they are without any rational foundation. These 'necessities' are often put on the account of the sacred or of divine will. This change of perspective is accentuated even more clearly in the three short texts of the beginning of the 1930s, where several important subjects for the later Adorno come to the fore: aesthetics, nature and history, language, Lukacs and Benjamin, among others. The background of these themes is the adoption of a kind of dialectic materialism. 33 Here, Husserl is already interpreted within the framework of the evolution of the phenomenological movement 34 to which he gave birth as well as of the philosophy of the 20th century. 35 The position accorded to Husserl in this context is significant. The claim of philosophy to be able to seize reality in its totality has turned out to be illusory, says Adorno, and this crisis is nothing else than the crisis of idealism. 36 The cornerstone of every idealist system is precisely this claim that the autonomous reason is capable to seize in itself and from itself the whole of reality. Recent philosophy (recent at the time of Adorno's essay), here, in particular, phenomenology, attests that this crisis of idealism is 'the effort, following the disintegration of the idealist systems and with the instrument of idealism, the autonome ratio, to gain a trans-subjective, binding order of being'. 37 The analysis of immediate data remains subjected to the jurisdiction of reason (Rechtsprechung der Vernunft) which is the last instance of the relation between reason and reality. Husserl's philosophy could not be characterized as a system that is not idealist enough any more (as the young Adorno would have had it), but to the contrary, as a system that remains too faithful to the idealism that it tries to overcome. The doctrine of essence which was regarded as the main anti-idealist stroke of
Husserl's finally reveals itself as the summit of idealism: the pure essence, the objectivity of which seems to spurn any subjective constitution, is nothing but subjectivity in its abstractness, the pure function of thinking, the T think' in the sense of the Kantian unity of consicousness. 41 This interpretation is taken even further in Zur Metakritik der Erkennt-nistheorie. 43 This book is about the philosophy of Adorno, rather than that of Husserl. Here we are already at the heart of Adorno's philosophyaccording to Tiedemann, Adorno in 1968 still considered the Metakritik as his most important work after Negative Dialektik. 44 As stated, the question here is on the possibility and the truth of theories of knowledge, but in such a way as to present a metacriticism, which is an openUP (June 2007) important notion of which we have seen the emergence of some characteristics, already in the study on the unconscious, and which will still be important for our discussion that follows. Let us start with a provisional orientation that I borrow from Martin Jay: 'metacritique meant going beyond the realm of philosophy per se into its social and historical underpinnings, without, however, reducing it to them in the manner of a vulgar sociology of knowledge.' 45 How does the philosophy of Husserl give an opportunity for such a metacritical reflection?
The key to this interpretation of Husserl comes from a remark in the Ideen that characterizes the work site of phenomenology as a 'sphere of being of absolute origins'. 46 The philosophy of Husserl is, as Ursprungsphilsophie (philosophy of the origin or of origins), a late prolongation of the old tradition of the prima philosophia. The essence of a first philosophy is independent of that which is identified by that philosophy as first, as the principle. However, its essence is found in the principle of identity contained by that philosophy. Everything should be deemed equivalent to this principle. And since everything is equivalent to it, the principle founds a claim to totality. In order to claim the equivalence of the totality, the principle should be immediately accessible, irreducible, in itself.
But there is a problem that Adorno uncovers here, namely that the notion of 'first'
itself is in need of mediation in order to become of force, since its immediateness becomes reflection's own only by the mediation of thought. 47 The claim of totality made by a philosophy of origin, obtains a totality only by the mediation of its own thought. Thus the first philosophy becomes idealist. Husserl (we discover once again here by parting from his involvement in a project of a philosophy of the origin) stays loyal to the essence of idealism. How does this idealist first philosophy function? Adorno answers:
Since the philosophical first must always already contain everything, spirit confiscates what is unlike itself and makes it the same, its property, spirit inventories it. Nothing may slip through the net. The principle must guarantee completeness. The accountability of the stock becomes axiomatic. Availability establishes the bond between philosophy and mathematics . . . it is precisely this subject that 'draws up an inventory of and 'confiscates' everything that is not identical to itself in order to assimilate it into his own identity. In this way is perpetuated the spirit of equivalence that reigns in the bourgeoisie or middle-class society and of which one could identify two dominant values: first, the bourgeoisie denigrates the event of the new; 52 and second, Husserl's phenomenology turns out to be a theory of possession that goes along with its shift towards neutrality and privatization. 53 In this way, by merging the subject and object in order to win the domain of immediate origins, the first philosophy buys the origin at the price of knowledge, and this, to such an extent that it loses its critical possibilities. 54 This process of assimilation (and exclusion) of the subject is the method. The method is the course taken starting from that which is already established and pursuing that which follows in a regular way from it -this is why every method presupposes a principle -and thus the methodical reasoning meets nothing that disturbs it from outside.
openUP (June 2007)
Husserl plays this game in the epoche: 'Doubt simply shifts judgement to preparing for assuming the vindication of pre-critical consciousness scientifically in secret sympathy with conventional sensibility.' 56 This kind of approach is typical of methods: the separation with regard to its subject reflects the social separation between intellectual and physical work; furthermore, the generality of the method is the fruit of specialization. 57 By assimilating everything to its own identity, the subject (as the principle of the first philosophy) comes close to the structure of an analytical judgement, a process that serves to raise the status of the subject. This splendour too reflects the social position of the philosopher, whose enlarged status is . . . the reflex to real powerlessness and insecurity. They are the selfdeafening roar through positivity of those who neither contribute to the real reproduction of life nor actually participate in its real mastery. As middlemen, they only commend and sell to the master his means of lordship, spirit objectified into method. 58 As a philosophy of identity, the first philosophy (which reveals itself in the form of a system 59 ), is finally in the service of the total state and of fascism, according to the severe conclusion of Adorno.
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But the system of the first philosophy is put in danger by experience; 61 the nonidentical is never completely dissolved in the system 62 -it is this conviction that drives the cultural criticism of Adorno. The logical core of this criticism is the interconnection between social processes and philosophy: 'The real life process of society is not something sociologically smuggled into philosophy through associates. It is rather the core of the contents of logic itself.' 63 Thus the metacritism is a social phenomenon striving to say the unsayable in the interest of the non-identical. 
